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1The author’s observations and conclusions are based on his study
visit of microfinance institutions and superintendencies of bank and fi-
nancial institutions in Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia from the period
January 25-February 6, 1999. He was with a study group composed of
legislators and top executives of several Philippine government institu-
tions.
 overnments in developing countries have tradi-
 tionally used subsidized credit programs and
  mandatory loan allocation to provide small-scale
borrowers access to formal credit. This is because banks
tend to discriminate against such borrowers thereby
making the latter resort to borrowing from informal mon-
eylenders. In light of this, the number of subsidized credit
programs in developing countries, including the Philip-
pines, has multiplied rapidly over the years.
Has this growth in number, however, eased the situ-
ation for the small-scale borrowers? Are these subsidized
programs the best approach to provide small borrowers
access to financial services?
This Policy Notes issue focuses on these concerns.
In particular, it reports on the author's observations and
conclusions regarding the experience of three Latin Ameri-
can countries as they move toward a sustainable, pri-
vate-led effort to address this need and how said experi-
ences may provide some lessons for the Philippines in
terms of its credit policy framework.1
Observations
] Throughout the decade of the 1980s and until
they liberalized their financial sectors in the 1990s, Gua-
temala, Peru and Bolivia implemented subsidized credit
programs, targeting specific sectors of their respective
economies in an attempt to provide these sectors ac-
cess to credit. They used government banks like agricul-
ture development banks to provide credit at highly subsi-
dized lending rates, often using government resources
as the source of loanable funds. The subsidized credit
programs invariably failed and led to the closure of gov-
ernment banks in the three countries.
] Financial liberalization and deregulation of in-








ditional lending institutions which catered to sectors of
society that could not access formal credit. These insti-
tutions are the credit-granting nongovernment organiza-
tions (NGOs) and microfinance banks which have devel-
oped very effective lending technologies that provide
credit to low-income clients and exhibit high loan repay-
ment rates. The best examples are GENESIS Empresarial
in Guatemala, MIBANCO in Peru, and FIE, PRODEM and
Banco Solidario in Bolivia.2
] In general, lending rates in Peru initially tended
to be high. Still, they were lower than those imposed by
alternative lending sources such as the informal money-
lenders. Then, with the opening of credit markets to
microfinance banks and other types of lenders, e.g., pri-
vate financial funds (PFF) in Peru, and greater competi-
tion in the financial marketplace, the lending rates even-
tually declined even without the need for any legislation
capping interest rates.
] In view of the lessons learned from the experi-
ences of the failed subsidized credit programs which
brought a huge fiscal burden on the governments of these
three Latin American countries, their governments now
put a strong emphasis on having sustainable microfinance
institutions (MFIs). As such, they consciously observe
the following policies:
l Government to provide the enabling environment
for private sector participation in the financial
marketplace;
l Deregulated interest rates to enable MFIs to
cover the costs of lending and funds as well as
the risks involved in microcredit;
l Emphasis on long-term sustainability of MFIs;
l Government to provide the necessary infrastruc-
ture, e.g., roads, water, sanitation and other
basic services, to make the local economy vi-
able; and
l Superintendencies of banks and financial insti-
tutions to have an appropriate regulatory frame-
work for MFIs.
Greater private sector participation in the
microfinance markets requires the market orientation of
interest rates, freedom from government-directed credit
programs, competition in the financial marketplace and
a framework of laws and regulation that recognizes the
special character of microfinance.
] The briefings conducted by the different MFIs
and superintendencies of banks and financial institutions
underscored the importance of:
————————
2The Annex enumerates and describes the institutions that were visited.
l maintaining the high quality of the loan portfo-
lios of the microfinance banks/institutions;
l imposing transparency in transactions through
well-organized financial statements;
l having a database in the bank superintenden-
cies that keeps a record of the loan transac-
tions of borrowing clients of banks and regis-
tered NGOs; and
l avoiding the provision of credit subsidies to
microfinance banks/institutions, whether the
funds be from government or external donors.
] Solidarity group loans that make use of peer
pressure within groups have been successfully used by
microfinance institutions/banks to reach target clientele.
The solidarity group thrives on the basis of good informa-
tion about the members of the groups as well as on peer
pressure exerted on each group member to repay his
individual loan.
] Within a framework of a liberalized and deregu-
lated financial market (competition among many lenders,
market-oriented interest rates and credit policies) and
good governance (a regime of appropriate laws and regu-
lations, provision by government of basic infrastructure),
the three countries were able to have thousands of low-
income people gain access to basic financial services.
] Low-income people save and pay their loans.
They are not afraid of taking commercial loans because
what is more important to them is continuing access to
credit, not the cost of credit. A myriad of opportunities3
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for microenterprises exists which enables small borrow-
ers to pay their loans on time and at a cost demanded by
microfinance banks/institutions.
] The cost of credit comes down with competi-
tion in the market. This is exemplified by the experience
of Bolivia's PRODEM which was charging an effective lend-
ing rate of 67 percent in 1991. Today, its effective lend-
ing rate is down to 43 percent. In contrast, the present
effective lending rate in the Bolivian informal credit mar-
kets is 185 percent! With economies of scale and lend-
ing flexibility, PRODEM was able to bring its effective lend-
ing rate down dramatically without sacrificing outreach
to low-income clients. Moreover, Banco Solidario, a re-
cently-established microfinance bank that also caters to
commercial borrowers, charges an average interest rate
of 30 percent a year for loans of less than US$3,000.
] After the closure of bankrupt government banks,
the financial systems of the three Latin American coun-
tries were dominated by a few private commercial banks
which catered mainly to their respective countries' tradi-
tional trade and commercial activities. With no medium
and small banks like the Philippines' development and
rural banks in existence, these Latin American countries
looked at the credit-granting NGOs and cooperatives
(which catered to small, low-income borrowers) as the
only alternative to informal moneylenders. As such, their
governments saw the need to transform these credit
NGOs into formal financial institutions. By so doing, these
NGOs were brought under the regulatory umbrella of bank
superintendencies. At the same time, these countries
also adjusted their regulations to make them appropri-
ate for microfinance operations, e.g., smaller capital re-
quirement of US$1 million for NGOs converting into Pri-
vate Financial Funds (PFFs) versus US$7 million for a
private bank.
Some of the major factors that guaranteed the failure of
these programs were political patronage, bureaucratic
inefficiency and distorted incentives. The common expe-
rience was that heavy government intervention in the fi-
nancial markets distorted the financial system and de-
nied low-income clients access to financial services since
influential and nonpoor borrowers were the ones who got
hold of the credit subsidies.
] Stable macroeconomic and financial policies
characterized by low inflation and reduction of the fiscal
deficit were necessary pre-requisities for efficient finan-
cial markets.
] Deregulation of interest rates, competition in
the financial marketplace and a stable macroeconomic
environment were responsible for bringing down lending
rates for the benefit of low-income borrowers and mak-
ing credit more accessible to low-income clients.
] The legal framework for the licensing and regu-
lation of MFIs was a critical factor that has encouraged
their growth and sustainability. The appropriate legal sta-
tus has allowed MFIs in Peru and Bolivia to expand their
microfinance portfolios by:
Lessons learned
] Government-subsidized and -directed credit pro-
grams provided the incentive for nonrepayment of loans.
In the three Latin American countries cited in this Notes,
the government banks that provided subsidized credit
programs had to close because of huge operating losses.
l mobilizing savings to finance increasing loan
portfolios, and
l borrowing from commercial loan markets.
] Sustainable microfinance can best thrive in a
policy environment that is devoid of subsidies to the credit
market. In Peru, all government credit programs were
consolidated in the COFIDE which now acts as a second-
tier bank for participating private financial institutions.
The government allowed the creation of private financial
institutions called EDPYMES to provide microfinance ser-
vices to small clients. In Bolivia, all subsidized and di-
rected credit programs were phased out during the finan-
cial crisis that hit the country in the early 1990s. The
objective was to avoid undue government competition with
the private sector in the microfinance market. A law also
created the Private Financial Funds which have a much
lower level of capitalization than commercial banks but4
Policy Notes
September 1999
are regulated by the superintendency of banks and finan-
cial institutions.
] The governments of the three Latin American
countries now focus on providing basic infrastructure such
as roads, bridges, water, sanitation, and basic educa-
tion to make the local economy viable and the local resi-
dents creditworthy.
] Microfinance institutions and banks strive for
sustainability in order for them to continue reaching low-
income clients and also to expand their current outreach.
It must repeatedly be emphasized that only sustainable,
not subsidized, institutions can provide low-income cli-
ents access to financial services. Successful MFIs have
aimed for long-term sustainability even at the start of
their programs as clearly shown in the history of their
operations in these three countries. They started and
continue to operate without any subsidy coming from the
government. Instead, most of them have strong support
from the private sector in terms of leadership and active
participation in their operations. Government assistance
is provided mainly through appropriate regulation of MFIs.
] There is concern about the proper use of exter-
nal donations and grants. These funds are better used in
building the capacities of microfinance institutions/banks
to reach low-income clients rather than in using them as
sources of subsidized credits. Donors should not pre-
scribe lending methodologies to be adopted by MFIs since
the success and effectiveness of these methodologies
largely depend on the area and types of clients being
serviced. Donors to MFIs in Latin America provide funds
for capability-building.
tors applied by supervisory and regulatory authorities to
the rural banks. This is to determine their relevance and
applicability to banks providing microfinance services.
] Congress should review the current law that cre-
ated the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), with
the objective of strengthening and making it focus on its
regulatory mandate over credit cooperatives.
] The National Credit Council (NCC) should issue
a clear policy terminating and prohibiting the provision of
credit subsidies. Credit subsidies distort the financial
markets and intervene in the efficient functioning of fi-
nancial institutions.
] The BSP, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, CDA and NCC should all work toward an appropriate
regulatory framework for microfinance institutions.
] The Land Bank, CDA and NCC should  join ef-
forts in building the capabilities of MFIs for efficient, vi-
able and sustainable operations.
] Finally, the Land Bank of the Philippines should
focus on providing wholesale funds for microlending by
credit cooperatives and private banks such as rural banks
and savings banks at market-oriented rates.  4
Recommendations
] The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) should
review current regulations affecting rural banks’
microfinance operations. Given the experiences of MFIs
in Latin America and the unique risks faced by MFIs, there
may be a need to review the present regulatory environ-
ment and the current standards and performance indica-
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Federacion Nacional de Cooperativas de Ahorro
y Credito Servicios Varios (FENACOAC), Guatemala City.
This is the National Credit Union Federation in Guate-
mala that provides technical assistance to member co-
operatives and, at the same time, operates a central
liquidity fund for members. Major emphasis was given
to the sustainability of the federation and its members
by pursuing market-oriented credit and interest rate
policies.
Budget, Finance and Monetary Committee, Con-
gress of Guatemala. The courtesy call at this important
Congressional committee revealed the efforts by the
government and the legislators in implementing major
financial and economic reforms that provided macroeco-
nomic stability and strengthened the financial markets.
Superintendencia de Bancos, Guatemala City. The
Superintendencia pointed out that a more modern ap-
proach to supervision, namely, risk-based supervision,
is very critical in building confidence in the financial
system and providing regulators a key instrument in
monitoring the health of financial institutions.
BanRural, Guatemala City. This bank used to be a
government bank but because of very high default rates
and huge losses, it was converted into a private devel-
opment bank. Borrowers viewed loans from the former
government bank as dole-outs and thus, did not repay
their loans. Private investors were later invited to in-
vigorate the bank with fresh capital and management
expertise.
Ministry of Finance, Guatemala City. The ministry
informed the group that the government and legisla-
tors are working on a special legislation for microfinance
institutions. The reform efforts of the Guatemalan gov-
ernment contributed to economic stability and the
strengthening of the financial markets.
GENESIS Empresarial, Guatemala City. This is a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) established to
Annex
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provide credit, advisory services and training to micro
and small enterprises. It has several programs, namely,
microenterprise promotion, support to small enter-
prises, village banks, credit for electrification of rural
areas, credit for introduction of drinking water in the
rural areas and credit for rural housing. All the programs
are noted for their profitability as they are based on
market-oriented principles.
La Union Argeta (Credit Union), Solola, Guatemala.
This is a credit union that is a member of FENACOAC. It
offers a variety of loan and savings products to mem-
bers. The briefing emphasized the importance of mar-
ket-oriented interest rates in screening borrowers and
motivating depositors to save with the credit union.
Accessibility of the credit union to members gives it a
distinct advantage over other alternative lending insti-
tutions.
Superintendencia de Bancos, Lima, Peru. This is
the institution that regulates and supervises financial
institutions in Peru. It supervises the EDPYMES—small
finance companies which are legally allowed to pro-
vide credit but not to accept savings from the public.
The revised banking law in Peru provided for the cre-
ation of EDPYMES which formalized the provision of
credit by NGOs and their supervision as well by the
superintendency. The standard supervisory require-
ments imposed on regular financial institutions are ap-
plied to EDPYMES by the superintendency.
Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE),
Lima, Peru. COFIDE is a state-owned second-tier de-
velopment bank. It provides loan funds to rural and mu-
nicipal “cajas,” cooperatives and EDPYMES for on-lend-
ing to small clients and microenterprises. COFIDE’s funds
are from the following: local and foreign commercial
banks, multilateral banks, proceeds from technical co-
operation and agreements, and the national treasury.




MIBANCO, Lima, Peru. MIBANCO is a recently-
organized microfinance bank. It was organized by the
Accion Communitaria Peru, a large credit NGO with help
from Accion International (an American NGO) and some
private investors. A special law was enacted which al-
lowed private banks to invest in another bank. It is a
profitable microfinance bank because of its conscious
adoption of market-based principles.
Fondo Financiero Privado FIE, S.A., La Paz, Bolivia
is a private financial fund—a type of regulated financial
institution—that serves micro and small enterprises in
Bolivia. As a regulated financial institution, it is able to
access public savings. Supervision by the Superinten-
dency of Banks and Financial Entities gives FIE credibil-
ity and confidence with its creditors and the public.
Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarollo de la
Micro Empresa (PRODEM), La Paz, Bolivia. PRODEM or-
ganized Banco Solidario (popularly known as BancoSol),
the first microfinance bank in Latin America. It owns 35
percent of BancoSol. At present, PRODEM continues to
provide microcredit, mostly to rural microentrepreneurs,
in Bolivia. With growing competition among MFIs in
Bolivia, PRODEM has recently resumed lending to ur-
ban microentrepreneurs who are also clients of
BancoSol. Hence, PRODEM now acts as a direct com-
petitor to BancoSol. Market-based principles guarantee
profitability which enables PRODEM to increase its out-
reach to rural microentrepreneurs.
Banco Solidario, La Paz, Bolivia. BancoSol is a com-
mercial bank which is engaged in providing microfinance
services to microentrepreneurs in Bolivia. As a bank, it
is allowed to provide both credit and savings services
to microentrepreneurs. Using market-oriented principles
in its solidarity (group) loans to clients, BancoSol has
demonstrated how a microfinance bank could be a very
profitable bank. Its widely-acclaimed success paved the
way for the enactment of a law which allows the cre-
ation of Private Financial Funds (PFF)—small regulated
financial entities that provide microfinance services to
Bolivia’s microenterprises. They have lower capital re-
quirements compared to regular banks.
FUNDAPRO, La Paz, Bolivia. This is a second-tier
private foundation which was created in 1992 with ini-
tial funding from USAID and the Bolivian government
to provide loan funds to MFIs in Bolivia. It has a financ-
ing program and a development program for
microfinance institutions. Under its financing program,
it provides loan funds to private institutions working
with microenterprises. Under its development program,
it provides technical assistance (mostly capability-build-
ing) to new credit NGOs and PFFs. As a second-tier
organization, it evaluates the performance of MFIs that
borrow under its financing program. It has already de-
veloped a set of indicators for evaluating MFI clients.
At present, FUNDAPRO is helping to establish deposit
insurance in Bolivia.
Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades
Financieras, La Paz, Bolivia. Under the 1928 banking
law, the Superintendencia used to regulate only banks.
In 1993, a new banking law was passed which allows
the Superintendencia to regulate new financial entities
such as savings and loan associations, credit unions and
NGOs providing microcredit. In line with this is the cre-
ation of regulated Private Financial Funds (PFFs) that cater
to microenterprises. The regulatory standards for banks
are applied to the PFFs. There is, however, an ongoing
technical assistance from USAID which is reviewing
these standards in terms of their applicability to
microfinance institutions.
Ministry of Finance, La Paz, Bolivia. The govern-
ment established the Microcredit Fund as an operational
mechanism of the Program for Support to Microcredit
and Rural Financing to be administered by the Fund for
the Development of the Financial System and Support
to the Productive Sector (FONDESIF). The Microcredit
Fund will allow the access to formal financial services
by larger segments of the Bolivian population. The fi-
nancial NGOs are the conduits for credit extension. The
Ministry of Finance has tasked a vice-minister with the
specific function of overseeing FONDESIF’s administra-
tion of the Microcredit Fund.  4
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